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Joanna Tidy, University of Sheffield 
 
 
This article problematizes the conceptualisation and use of ‘combat’ within critical scholarship 
on masculinities, militaries and war. We trace, firstly, how ‘combat’ appears as an empirical 
category within traditional war studies scholarship, describing an ostensibly self-evident 
physical practice. We then examine how feminist and gender approaches – in contrast – reveal 
‘combat’ as a normative imagination of martial violence. This imagination of violence is key to 
the constitution of the masculine ideal, and normalisation of military force, through the heroic 
soldier myth. We argue, however, that despite this critical impulse, much of feminist and 
gender analysis evidences conceptual “slippage”: combat is still often treated as a ‘common 
sense’ empirical category – a thing that ‘is’ – in masculinities theorising. This treatment of 
gendered-imaginary-as-empirics imports a set of normative investments that limit the extent 
to which the heroic soldier myth, and the political work that it undertakes, can be 
deconstructed. As a consequence, whilst we know how masculinities are constituted in 
relation to ‘combat’, we lack the corollary understanding of how masculinities constitute 
‘combat’, and how the resulting imagination sustains military authority and the broader social 
acceptance of war. We argue that unpacking these dynamics and addressing this lacuna is key 
to the articulation of a meaningfully ‘critical’ gender and military studies going forward.  
 
 
Key words: combat, military masculinities, critical; hegemonic masculinity 
 
Introduction 
In this article we explore the conceptual and normative work that ‘combat’ does 
within literature on gender and war, in particular within that grounded in 
theorisations of military/ised masculinities. In both academic literature and lay 
parlance, ‘combat’ variously describes a common sense empirical reality (“as if it were 
obvious and fixed, just plain combat” - Enloe 2013: 261) or a normative imagination 
of a very particular form of martial violence. This normative imagination underpins 
the masculinity-defining mythologised figure of the heroic soldier, in whom resides 
the “ideals, fantasies, and desires” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 838) associated 
with privileged iterations of masculinity. i  This mythologised figure, in turn, is a 
significant locus for the political project of sustaining martial authority and instating 
the broader social acceptance of war. Connecting an apparently objective physical 
practice of violence with larger issues of normative masculinity, normative civil-
military relations, and legitimate state violence, the somewhat slippery 
conceptualisation of ‘combat’ grounds nearly all analyses of gender, war, and the 
military. What we identify as the concept’s comparative under-theorisation, 
(de)politicisation, and ‘common-sense’ status is both puzzling and, from the 
perspective of a critical military/masculinities studies aimed at problematizing 
collective violence, in need of analytical redress. 
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We locate the combat-as-empirical-reality usage as most typical of traditions that 
include strategic studies, traditional war studies and military sociology (hereafter 
‘conventional literatures’). We then discuss how the second usage, ‘combat’ as 
normative imaginary, has been developed in feminist and gender approaches to the 
study of masculinities, militaries and war. In her piece Combat and ‘combat’: a feminist 
reflection, Enloe (2013) reminds us that ‘combat’, called upon to carry “a burden of 
gendered meaning”, is “worthy of careful feminist analysis” (p.260). We argue that 
the unpacking of ‘combat’ as a normative category has been key to the critical agenda 
of making visible otherwise obscured power relations through the denaturalisation of 
that which appears ‘common sense’ and ‘given’. This has been an important tool in 
deconstructing the myth of the heroic soldier, revealing and critiquing the political 
work that this figure undertakes.  
 
We argue that there has, however, been conceptual slippage within critical feminist 
and gender approaches to the study of masculinities, militaries and war. ‘Combat’ is 
still called upon as a ‘common sense’, or as Enloe calls it, “obvious” (2013:261) 
shorthand when describing fighting and martial violence. In other words, combat 
remains an empirical ‘thing’ across both the conventional and critical literatures – and 
thus becomes entangled, as a foundational ‘objective’ premise, with the very 
imaginary critical scholars seek to denaturalise and deconstruct. This limits the extent 
to which the heroic (combat) soldier myth, and the political work that it undertakes, 
may be effectively critiqued. One of the key consequences, we argue, is that whilst 
critical scholars have effectively grappled with the ways in which masculinities are 
constituted in relation to ‘combat’, we have yet to tackle, in a sustained and 
systematic fashion, the issue of how masculinities constitute ‘combat’ (as a normative 
imaginary). We have perhaps yet to begin even posing what is, admittedly, a counter-
intuitive question. If we are to adequately illuminate the reproduction of military 
authority and the broader social acceptance of war, however, this critical analysis of 
the co-constitutive arrangement of ‘combat’ and ‘masculinity’ is essential. This 
missing piece of the puzzle allows us to better understand how martial violence is 
called into meaningfulness as legitimate and celebrated ‘combat’ along gendered lines. 
 
The article thus proceeds by first outlining the development of ‘combat’ as, initially, a 
theoretical concept within classical theories of war, followed by its transformation 
into an empirical descriptive category within modern military sociology and strategic 
studies. This is followed by a discussion of the animation and political interrogation of 
the relationship between combat and heroic masculinity in critical gender and 
feminist analyses. Here, we highlight, as mentioned, an inadvertent slippage between 
examining ‘combat’ as a normative imaginary and deploying combat as an empirical 
category upon which to found critique. Each section provides an overview of key 
theoretical moves and analytic themes within two broad literatures: so-called 
‘conventional’ military and strategic studies and ‘critical’ gender and feminist 
assessments of the military and masculinity. Both literatures, it should be noted, 
demonstrate Anglo-European centrism. Empirically, they consider primarily, though 
not exclusively, war, military organisations, and gender within the modern West and, 
ideologically, to a greater or lesser degree, do so from a liberal perspective. There are 
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therefore also a strong colonial and racial dimensions to the constitution of ‘combat’ 
that, though largely bracketed here, also require substantial future analysis. 
 
There is no bright line between the two broad scholastic churches examined here, and 
it is not our intention to claim that all works or all scholars falling into these traditions 
demonstrate the conceptual conflation of combat we problematize here. It is, instead, 
our aim to highlight the ways in which this conceptual slippage may occur, drawing on 
key exemplary texts, and the implications of this move for the broader critical project 
(articulated by what is otherwise frequently excellent work). To that end, the article 
goes on to outline the logic of the oscillation between combat-as-empirics and 
‘combat’-as-imaginary by revisiting two key pieces of critical research into military 
masculinities: Barrett’s pioneering 1992 study of gendered/ing hierarchies within the 
US Navy, and Daggett’s innovative 2015 analysis of the queering of drone warfare. We 
conclude with a reflection upon the stakes of our analysis and fruitful avenues of 
inquiry going forward. 
 
Combat as an empirical category 
The ‘commonsensical’ empirical construction of combat as the basic unit of warfare 
is, at least in its current form, traceable to Clausewitz, and is a logically recurrent 
theme in modern strategic and military scholarship. For Clausewitz, fighting is the 
central and defining activity of the military; it is the means of achieving the ultimate 
(political) ends of warfare (Howard 2002:37-8; Clausewitz 1976: 95, 142-3). Clausewitz 
refers to this form of fighting as das Gefecht, which Howard suggests ought to be 
translated as ‘combat’, referring to both a general practice (physical fighting) and a 
limited, temporally specific engagement (Howard 2002: 37-8). It should be noted, 
following Howard, that this analytical prioritization of the violent activities of the 
military distinguished Clausewitz from his contemporaries (Howard 2002: 37; 
Clausewitz 1976: 95). The fact that to many readers this equation of warfare with 
combat with the purpose of the military will seem obvious is a reflection of the 
naturalisation of this formula. In other words, Clausewitz theorised and constructed 
combat, and its relationship to modern warfare, as a concept, rather than the 
empirical description of the true, or factual, nature of warfare it is often taken as today. 
As On War became canonized as the seminal work on modern warfare (Howard and 
Paret 1976: viii-ix) – indeed, the nature of war itself – the subtle theoretical aspect of 
Clausewitz’s work was occluded.  
 
The layered conceptualisation of combat as ‘obviously’ physical fighting, the building-
block of warfare, and the primary activity of the military, strongly informed – as 
empirical premise – the subsequent development of nineteenth and twentieth-
century understandings of war and the military (Strachan 2012; see also Nordin and 
Oberg 2015: 394)ii. In the twentieth century post-war era, military sociologist Morris 
Janowitz argued that although the majority of military personnel, resources, and 
activities are no longer directly involved in combat, “military authority...must strive to 
make combat units its organizational prototype” (1959: 480). For Janowitz, these 
combat units are “functionally distinguished” (480, fn10) from other aspects of the 
military by their engagement in dangerous, physical “battle” (481) – or combat as a 
practice of fighting. Janowitz’ contemporary, Samuel Huntington, similarly reiterated 
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Clausewitz’s understanding of combat as the physical practice of war – armed, 
between individuals or groups of individuals, and violent (1957: 11). Like Janowitz and 
Clausewitz, Huntington regards the balance of the military organisation as relevant 
only in so far as it supports the military’s central mandate: combat (11-12).  
 
This naturalisation of Clausewitz’s theoretical conceptualisation of combat (and its 
relationship to the broader military enterprise) into a descriptive, ‘found’ empirical 
category, is still more apparent in the term’s usage throughout the contemporary 
strategic studies literature. Posen, for instance, in his analysis of the modern mass 
army, refers to its “combat power” – the ability of the military to effectively conduct 
organised violence (1993: 84). Colin Gray reflects a similar understanding of combat 
in his study of “national style” in military strategy, arguing that US officers in WWII 
were trained to be logistically ready for combat, while German officers were trained 
in the practice of combat – fighting between conventional military groups (1981: 25-
6). This synonymity of combat with ‘simply’ war fighting is perhaps best reflected in 
Stephen Biddle’s work, which, arguing for the continuing relevance of land war and 
conventional arms, refers to “old-fashioned close combat against surviving, actively 
resisting opponents” (2003; see also Betts 1994, 2016).   
 
This is not to say that this literature lacks normative discussion. The vast majority of 
classical theories of war, strategic studies, and, particularly, military sociology, are 
concerned with the appropriate regulation and political (civilian) control of military 
violence (see Millar 2016). Huntington, for instance, is clear that it is this mandate for 
fighting that separates the military from the civilian sphere (1957, 11). Like Clausewitz, 
Huntington is keen to provide the institutional and political context – the state-
sanctioned military – that distinguishes combat, as legitimate violence, from other 
forms of interpersonal physical confrontation. Janowitz, interestingly, goes further, 
unproblematically referring to the credibility of combat “heroes” as an objective 
factor in military authority and organisation, rather than a subjective judgment (1959, 
479). The normativity of this discussion, however, is displaced from the 
conceptualisation of combat itself, which is static, to the relationship between combat 
and military and civil authority. Combat may enable individuals to distinguish 
themselves, or be put to positive or negative political ends, but is not a normative 
category or practice in and of itself. It simply ‘is’. 
 
This correspondingly apoliticised understanding of combat is most evident in the large 
literature regarding combat motivation. Shils and Janowitz’s early study of the 
Wehrmacht in WWII laid the groundwork for this decontextualisation by not only 
reproducing an understanding of combat as “stubborn fighting”, but also by 
emphasizing the irrelevance of broader political concerns to individual motivation and 
combat efficacy (1948). Dave Grossman, in his controversial finding of soldiers’ 
apparent reluctance to kill, propounds a similarly circumscribed understanding of 
combat as direct killing in a military context, and “combat veterans” as those who 
were present in the physical space of battle (1996). More recent studies of combat 
cohesion, though arriving at different ‘diagnoses’ of combat motivation (e.g. group 
solidarity vs. training and drill) maintain a similar framing of the problem, and thus 
underlying conceptualisation of combat: Given that combat is violent, dangerous, and 
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contravenes civilian social norms, why fight? (see, for instance, King 2015; Wong et al 
2006; Newsome 2003). Throughout, though a distinction is occasionally drawn 
between close, physically-proximate (infantry) combat and contemporary missions 
flown by fighter pilots, (see Grossman 1996: 234; Robben 2006), the conventional 
strategic and military sociology literature produces a common, purportedly-empirical 
description of combat. It is constructed as a discrete, physical event, and as therefore 
possessing a definitive “‘before’ and an ‘after’” (Bourke 2000: 11). It is also, as implied 
Clausewitz’s emphasis upon fighting, spatially limited in scope, as war per se involves 
a variety of practices beyond a physical engagement. Though technology and political 
context may change, combat is also, by implication, a sufficiently uniform practice and 
experience of physical fighting that, as an empirical category, it may be applied across 
diverse conflicts.  
 
Mainstream approaches to military and strategic studies are also alive to the 
relevance of gender (or, in many cases, more accurately, sex) to combat. It is 
understood to be the practice of men, as both an historical regularity (see Best 1998, 
31; Goldstein 2001; van Creveld 2000) and a ‘proving’ or ‘testing’ ground for 
masculinity (see, for instance, Stouffer et al, 1949; van Creveld 2000). Early studies on 
the relationship between masculinity and combat articulated the notion that it was a 
given and findable empirical phenomenon. In their study of military socialisation, 
Arkin and Dobrovsky (1978: 156; see also Eisenhart 1975) note, for instance, “that it 
is in combat that the core of masculinity is demonstrated”, through showing “courage, 
[and] lack of squeamishness” (Stouffer et al., 1949 quoted in Arkin and Dobrovsky 
(1978: 156). They detail how combat capacity and experience stratifies the military 
institution both formally and informally, privileging and elevating those assigned to 
and experiencing combat.  
 
This constitution of combat (and war) as the sole preserve of men is not posited as an 
active matter of conceptual construction, but rather as empirical description. Combat 
is a ‘thing’ against which masculinity might be tested and through which it might be 
demonstrated but it remains very much a fixed empirical reality. Generally, though 
not uniformly, as a result of both historical production and ontological approach, this 
literature represents sex/gender, and thus men and masculinity, as correspondent. 
Consequently the male/masculine (as interchangeable) nature of combat is 
apoliticised and naturalised into the empirical description of an objective social 
phenomenon. That said, in these emphases on the “fraternal order” of the military 
(Janowitz 1957) – and centrality of masculine solidarity to combat motivation – 
normative characteristics subtly begin to creep into the ostensibly descriptive 
empirical label. This is perhaps most evident in the polemical literature arguing for 
women’s exclusion from combat, exemplified by Martin van Creveld (2000). The 
conventional military/strategic literature, despite its inclinations towards positivist 
social science, is not immune to conceptual ‘slippage’. This is something feminist 
scholarship has given much more attention to, as we consider below. 
 
Durieux provides a cogent summary of the conventional literature’s understanding of 
combat as, “on the individual level, [a practice] in which a soldier gives death to 
another and exposes himself to the deadly blows of his adversary” (2012: 143). As 
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illustrated by this brief review, combat, as an empirical category, refers to violent, 
plausibly reciprocal activity, involving elements of both killing and risk, between men. 
Though the literature exhibits a normative preference for the regulation of this 
fighting under the auspices of the military, and by the state, the empirical practice of 
combat itself is supposedly removed from issues of politics (and, potentially, ethics). 
This apoliticisation of combat via empiricism – not entirely in keeping with 
Clausewitz’s explicitly theoretical conceptualisation – and its connection to 
men/masculinity has been problematized, as we explore next, by a robust feminist, 
masculinities, and critical military/militarisation research programme. Within this 
work, however, vestiges of the empirical status/existence of combat have survived. As 
indicated by critical engagement with the ‘heroic soldier myth’, empirical combat as 
masculine activity often forms a jumping off point for gendered analysis, rather than 
an object of deconstruction in its own right. 
 
Combat as Normative Category 
In contrast to the approaches reviewed above, the aim of critical feminist and gender 
approaches to the study of the military and war is not to problem-solve issues of 
military power, but rather to problematize this power (Basham, Belkin and Gifkins, 
2015:1). Though far from monolithic, this ‘critical’ approach can be characterised by 
its sceptical curiosity, “questioning underlying assumptions, investigating things that 
conventional commentators typically leave unexplored” (Enloe, 2015: 3). It can also 
be said to “approach[…] military power as a question rather than taking it for granted” 
(Basham, Belkin and Gifkins, 2015: 1). A key component of this project is making visible 
the gendered power operating in war, the military, the international system, and 
ultimately, “how much power it takes to maintain the international political system in 
its present form” (Enloe 1989: 3). These interventions reveal that there is nothing 
inevitable or natural about the configurations of international politics in and through 
which we all live; it is not satisfactory to say of any aspect of these political orderings 
“it’s just the way it is”. This tradition of scholarship is sceptical, therefore, of ‘common 
sense’.  
 
Correspondingly, feminist and gender approaches articulate a suspicion of the 
ostensibly descriptive, ‘simply’ empirical account of the military and combat provided 
above. In particular, critical approaches question the unproblematic bundling of 
sex/gender into ‘soldier’ that underlies empirical combat, as well as the explicit 
bracketing of normative concerns regarding the legitimacy of state violence (see 
Dawson 1994:1). In contrast, feminist and gender approaches have, in effect, 
conceptualised combat as a normative category that carries a heavy “burden of 
gendered meaning” (Enloe 2013: 260). Combat, in other words, as a concept, is not 
correspondently reflective of an actually-existing and obvious practice, but rather 
encapsulates a range of assumptions as to socially-valued masculinity, civil-military 
relations, violence, physical geographies, and the state.  
 
Megan Mackenzie, for instance, in her detailed examination of socio-cultural myths 
regarding the long-standing (though now defunct) US military policy of excluding 
women from combat, observes that “the definition of combat itself is elusive: both 
‘combat’ and ‘combat exclusion’ are constructed” (2015: 19). In sharp contrast to the 
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conventional literature, which accepts the definition of combat as stable and objective, 
Mackenzie highlights the historical contingency of the concept as changing over time, 
in accordance with the military’s needs (32-3; see also Enloe 2007: 82). Similarly, 
Zalewski observes a disconnect between the empirical fact that “relatively few men 
who have been in the military have ever been in combat” and the hierarchical 
valorisation and prioritisation of ‘combat’ by the military institution, as seen in the 
conventional writings above (1995: 353). Zalewski suggests that this construction is 
furthered by the “ideological potency” of combat, which, though having no fixed 
definition, is “wielded as a criterion to separate the ‘men from boys’” and, of course, 
women from men (353). Unpacking combat as a normative category, therefore, 
involves interrogating the conditions of its social construction and the politics it 
contains and obscures (Enloe 2013).  
 
Key to this project, as implied by the illustrative quotations above, is an examination 
of the relationship between combat and normative idealisations of socially-valorised 
masculinity, as articulated within the context of the military. As has been well-
established in the literature, for critical scholars, there is no singular (or self-evident) 
“military masculinity”. Masculinities are not static, monolithic sets of character traits 
or types (Connell 1995; and see Duncanson 2009: 64), nor do they correspond to 
essentialist constructions of sex. Instead, just as “militaries...are not unified or 
homogenous structures” (Sasson-Levy 2003: 320), there are a “multiplicity” of 
(military) masculinities (Kirby and Henry 2012: 445; Barrett 1996; Baaz and Stern 2009: 
499) within and across institutions. Understood as “values, capacities, and practices” 
(Hutchings 2008: 402), military masculinities and the idealised ‘selves’ they conjure 
are models rather than tangible realities (Woodward 2000: 644; see also Duncanson 
2009: 65). Together, these masculinities – and femininities (Sjoberg 2007; 
Stachowitsch 2013: 161) – reflect and reproduce hierarchical orders of gender, race, 
and class (Messerschmidt 2012: 73).  
 
Combat is identified by critical scholars as central to the articulation of these 
hierarchies, and their reproduction outside the formal institution. Not entirely unlike 
the military sociologists above, critical scholars observe that the institutions of war 
and the military function as “a crucial arena for the construction of masculinity in the 
larger society” (Hale 2012: 700; Connell 1995). Rather than acting as a ‘proving ground’ 
for an actually-(pre)existing maleness, however, the military (re)produces a “(variable) 
set of values, capacities, and practices that are identified as exemplary for men” 
(Hutchings 2008:402; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832), or as Belkin puts it (2012: 
3) a “set of beliefs, practices and attributes” that are widely valued and privileged 
within society.  
 
More specifically, critical scholars argue that it is combat through which these beliefs 
and practices are articulated. Combat, they observe, is constituted within the military 
as a particular imagined space of idealised violence in which soldiers can “prove their 
manhood” (Enloe 2013: 260). Combat masculinity is therefore characterised within 
the literature as typified by stereotypically masculine, socially-valorised attributes, 
such as “aggressiveness and endurance of hardships and physical toughness” (Hale 
2012: 705; see also Connell 1995), “risk-taking, discipline, technological 
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mastery…absence of emotion, and rational calculation” (Barrett 2001:79). Within the 
constellation of military masculinities, critical work frequently refers to “the 
hegemonic masculinity of the combat soldier” (Sasson-Levy 2003: 327), as both 
additional military and civilian masculinities are (implicitly or explicitly) articulated in 
reference to this idea. Both conventional and critical literatures are therefore 
concerned with the relationship between men and the military – particularly the 
crucible of combat. They differ substantially, however, in ontology. For conventional 
scholars, ‘real men’ pre-exist combat, and prove their mettle within it. From the 
critical perspective, the military, through its institutional emphasis on the priority of 
combat, produces ‘real men’, reifies the notion that there is such a thing as ‘real men’, 
and promulgates authoritative ideals of masculinity. 
 
Coupled with this contingent, though socially ordering understanding of masculinity, 
combat becomes a normative imaginary of martial violence through which gendered 
ideals, fantasies and desires can be organisediii. The exact form of that imagination 
might change or be contingent to a particular process of masculinity formation, but it 
remains an ‘anchor’ for the social (re)production of military masculinities (Hale 2012: 
713; Duncanson 2009: 65; Woodward 2000). Various configurations of the notions of 
risk (Barrett, 1996), proximate killing (Daggett, 2015: 365) and reciprocity of violence 
(Enloe 2013: 260) define combat as a gendering category. As a special, celebrated and 
exclusive domain of violence and of gender definition and meaning combat “is 
contested, protected, and negotiated” (Enloe 2013: 261). It is imagined in various 
ways to define who is ‘in’ and ‘out’ of particular privileged categories. Being associated 
with combat, critical scholars observe, accords privileges (Tidy, 2016).  
 
In this sense, combat is understood by the critical literature to constitute a point of 
positive linking and negative differentiation (Duncanson 2009: 67-8, following Hansen 
2006). The apparent monopoly over combat (and therefore hegemonic masculinity) 
sets the military apart from other parts of society; it is the fundamental point of 
differentiation through which the military can be imagined as apart and special, 
occupying the privileged side of the (also imagined) civil-military divide. The difference 
between this claim and the similar one made by writers such as Clausewitz and 
Huntington hinges on whether combat is seen as a ‘real’ thing, empirically 
differentiated from other forms of interpersonal violence, or a socially produced and 
embedded category of gender and power. As discussed further below, combat 
therefore performs an immense amount of analytical work in the critical 
deconstruction of the military: it is posited as a constructed, empirical ‘site’ wherein 
military personnel enact and negotiate their gendered/ing social identity and 
institutional status and, more problematically, as a conceptual anchor for the analysis 
of the hierarchies these negotiations produce. 
 
Combat and the Heroic Soldier Myth 
 
The critical leverage proffered by this treatment of combat as a gendered normative 
imaginary is perhaps best illustrated by gender and feminist theorists’ empirical 
identification, and subsequent critical deconstruction of, a cultural figure crucial to 
the normalisation – and depoliticisation – of combat: heroic (combat) soldiers. In 
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doing so, critical scholars are able to foreground the normative assumptions (and 
political commitments) smuggled into the ostensibly objective observations of the 
traditional literature. The conventional writers discussed at the outset, though to 
varying degrees of explicit acknowledgment, propound and rely upon the idea of the 
heroic soldier. Dave Grossman’s Introduction to the revised (2014) issue of his On 
Killing offers, for example, a straightforward statement of his normative position. The 
book, Grossman writes: 
 
…is being read by countless thousands of warriors who are called upon by our 
nation to kill in combat. And it is the single greatest honor of my life to have been 
of service to these magnificent men and women… 
 
Grossman neatly encapsulates the interrelation of combat, nation, and some form of 
elevation or glory (in his formulation it is ‘magnificence’) attributed to soldiers. 
Feminist scholars add gender to this nexus, and deconstruct it as a site of gendered 
power rather than a ‘common sense’ ‘good’.  
 
As Sasson-Levy (2003: 327) notes, it is “almost impossible to constitute a military 
identity (masculine or feminine) that does not relate to the identity of the warrior” or 
as Duncanson (2009: 64) describes it, the “warrior model”. The existence of multiple 
masculinities (and femininities) in a military context, as noted above, should not 
distract from the structures of power asymmetry which they entail: “the hegemony of 
the warrior model is part of the reason that certain men dominate within the military, 
[and] why there is pressure on men to conform to this form of masculinity (Duncanson 
2009: 65). The military is a space within which ‘gender’ – and other axes of power and 
subordination – are made, learned, practiced and reproduced (see Baaz and Stern 
2009: 499) and ‘combat’ is a crucial conceptual anchor point for this gendering and all 
that it entails both in military training and during war. As Duncanson (2009: 65) 
describes, “[m]any accounts of military training demonstrate how gender informs this 
process, as all things ‘feminine’ are disparaged, and ‘manhood’ is equated with 
toughness under fire” (although cf. Belkin 2012).  
 
Within this literature, the myth of the magnificent warrior is grounded in a heroic 
narrative of combat, an imagination of martial violence that is privileged, powerful 
and strongly normative. The heroic soldier myth may change (see Dawson, 1994; 
Cooper and Hurcombe, 2009: 103), but it remains persistent (Woodward, Winter and 
Jenkings, 2009: 219), largely due to the grounding provided by combat in the soldier’s 
relationship with the polity. As combat is imagined to involve elements of risk, sacrifice, 
and violence on behalf of the group (Mackenzie 2015: 34), the hierarchical elevation 
of the soldier over the civilian population is assured, despite changes in the ‘actual’ 
empirical practice of martial violence over time. Within feminist and gender analysis, 
combat as a normative category therefore remains relationally stable, though 
substantively changeable. As the heroic (combat) soldier “expands our own ego 
boundary ecstatically into that of the nation” (Butler 2006: 145), warfare is therefore 
understood through the figure of the soldier (Woodward, Winter and Jenkings, 2009: 
219; Woodward and Jenkings, 2012: 351). The “legitimacy or otherwise” (Woodward, 
Winter and Jenkings, 2009: 211) of war, and the overall political community, is thus 
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affirmed or contested (see for example Achter, 2010; Tidy, 2016; Millar 2016) through 
the lens of this figure.  
 
Significantly, the combat imaginary that produces the ‘heroic soldier’ parallels, at an 
individual level, state-state ‘combat’, such that the heroic soldier is imagined as a 
microcosm of the heroic state. The heroic soldier, foundationally constituted by 
combat, is therefore presented as an ideal of, simultaneously, masculinity and 
citizenship (Sasson-Levy, 2002). As Dahl Christensen identifies, “[t]he soldier becomes 
a proponent for a whole society’s set of values” (2015: 355). Deconstructing the myth 
of the heroic soldier – and its constitutive relationship between combat and 
masculinity – is therefore key to the critical project of feminist and gender scholarship. 
If it seems to be common sense that soldiers are heroic, that they do a thing called 
combat, and that this combat is in some ways an elevated and special form of violence, 
then it is the job of critical scholars to unpack the assumptions, trace the political 
investments and the power relations that do powerful work both ‘out there’, in 
military discourse and popular imaginary, and ‘in here’, in our own scholarship.  
 
Combat as an (un)moving Target 
As the above overview has demonstrated, understanding ‘combat’ as a normative 
imaginary reveals the gendering, highly ‘powered’ ‘work’ that it does. The specific 
content of ‘combat’ is contingent and flexible and it is called upon and into being in 
particular forms at particular times to associate, disassociate, include and exclude 
from particular, privileged categories of military masculinity and their “attendant 
promises and entitlements” (Baaz and Stern 2009: 499). Unpacking ‘combat’ as a 
normative imagination, or model, of martial violence has been a means of bringing to 
the surface the constitution of privileged forms of gender and the power relations that 
are entailed. It has revealed the constructed and deconstructable form of the heroic 
soldier myth, and ‘his’ role in instating and normalising gendered, martial power and 
its associated state violence. This has been key to the critical knowledge project of 
feminist and gender approaches.  
 
As we will now argue, however, this same literate demonstrates a tendency towards 
‘slippage’ between the two ways of using ‘combat’. To put it bluntly, ‘combat’ gets 
used just as “plain combat” (Enloe 2013: 261), including in work that also deconstructs 
it as a normative imagination, submerging and smuggling its normative heritages and 
investments into scholarly work that is otherwise concerned with the critical 
knowledge project. This can hamper analysis of the complexities of the “burden of 
gendered meaning” that ‘combat’ carries (Enloe 2013: 260), and risks reproducing the 
gendered and gendering asymmetries entailed in it.  
 
In some instances within the literature on military/ised masculinities the importance 
of combat to the constitution of masculinities is noted in a broader and almost 
obligatory sense, but then the analysis ‘moves on’ without tracing precisely what is 
meant by ‘combat’ in the particular setting being examined, or unpacking what 
gendering ‘work’ it is doing there (see Barrett, 1996; Duncanson 2009). Higate, for 
instance, in the major 2003 edited volume Military Masculinities, questions whether 
“the presence of some women, particularly at the heart of the male bastion of face-
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to-face combat, is likely to affect the nature of the combat masculine warrior ethic?” 
(205). Here, though Higate explicitly identifies combat as masculine and problematizes 
essentialist views of women as ‘importing’ femininity into the military, he also 
reiterates the male nature of physical, reciprocal combat – combat as obvious practice 
– and its apparent centrality to military identity. It is correspondingly unclear whether 
Higate is referring to combat as masculinist normative imaginary, employing its 
construction within the military itself, or is himself analytically deploying an empirical 
understanding.  
 
Similarly, the critical literature, particularly when working to highlight the elision of 
marginalised persons – and masculine/feminine subjectivities – within both the 
military institution and broader citizenship myths, frequently relies on an empirical 
conceptualisation of combat. In her examination of the public representation of 
deceased US female soldiers, for instance, Millar refers to the awkwardness of the 
contrast between US official combat exclusion policy and “actual combat practice” 
(2015: 766; see also Holland 2006: 3; King 2015 122-3) – employing an empirical 
understanding of combat to, in essence, censure the US military for misrepresenting 
the experiences of women. A similar slippage is evident in Tidy’s (2016) discussion of 
the privileging of combat experiences within the public discourse of the military 
dissent movement and the consequent gendered asymmetry of war knowledge. 
Whilst Tidy argues that the focus on combat soldiers reproduces a narrow 
conceptualisation of war, marginalising the experiences or large portions of the 
military, her discussion of the political power of “experiences of combat” (100) tacitly 
maintains combat as an empirical ‘thing’ (see also Perez and Sasson-Levy 2015).  
 
In other instances, combat is used as an empirical descriptor, perhaps by referring to 
a ‘combat soldier’ or a ‘non-combat soldier’ (Sasson-Levy, 2003; 2008; Woodward, 
2000, Tidy 2016) or referring to soldiers having seen or been in combat (Stachowitsch, 
2013; Daggett, 2015; Duncanson 2009). In doing so, the literature slides between 
conceptual references to the figurative heroic soldier, a potentially useful conceptual 
construct, and seemingly habitual references to ‘actual’ soldiers engaged in a real 
practice. Our cited examples here are not meant to be exhaustive. As indicated by our 
citation of many these same writers in our discussion above, the work we critique has 
been crucial to theorising military/ised masculinities and unpacking combat as a 
normative category. We argue that the criticality of this collective work could be 
enhanced however, through a conceptual attention to ‘combat’ that avoids slippage 
between empirical and normative category.  
 
In sum, the critical literature slides towards the reification of combat as empirically 
real, in a vein that largely duplicates the constructions of the conventional literature 
upon which its critique is built, and in doing so also reifies a particular normative 
relationship between combat and masculinity. Christensen and Jensen, in their 2014 
critique of the hegemonic masculinities literature, observe that patriarchal power 
relations – men’s domination over women – has been definitionally incorporated into 
the key concept of “hegemonic masculinity” (64). Christensen and Jensen suggest that 
although patriarchal power relations may characterise the great majority, if not all, of 
empirically observed hegemonic masculinities, importing this empirical regularity as a 
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necessary conceptual assumption limits the critical power and insights of the resulting 
scholarship (64). As argued by Beasley, “[...] it is politically deterministic and defeatist 
to assume that the most dominant...ideals/forms of masculinity are necessarily the 
same as those that guarantee authority over women” (2008: 88, in Christensen and 
Jensen 2014). The conceptual assumption of men’s dominance over women 
undermines, in other words, the potential power and emancipatory potential of 
critical gender work by premising its central critique upon the existence of the 
relationship it seeks to problematize and replace.  
 
The implicit reliance upon an empirically-real combat, as key to producing not just 
masculinity, but the central, militarily and socially valorised masculinity (the heroic 
soldier), encounters a parallel structural problem. If, as outlined above, the central 
problematic of the critical feminist/masculinities/military research agenda is the 
deconstruction of the gendered relationships and associations that produce the 
political possibility/ies for violence and/or war, the conceptual importation of an 
apparent empirical relationship between masculinity and combat undercuts its 
analytic and political potential. In other words, it is difficult to critique, deconstruct, 
and constitute alternatives to the heroic soldier myth premised upon the ‘proving 
ground’ of combat when this precise relationship is ‘baked into’ the 
empirical/normative slippage of the concept itself.  
 
The treatment of normative-combat-as-empirical is a specific, arguably foundational, 
iteration of a general problem Hutchings outlines as characterising the gender and 
war literature. Hutchings observes that in instances where masculinity is constructed 
as “materially necessary to war because of what war is taken for granted to be...war 
anchors masculinity, in the sense that the meaning of masculinity reflects the 
requirements of war” (Hutchings 2008: 393). This dynamic is redoubled, and specified, 
by the conceptual ambiguity of ‘combat’, wherein what Hutchings refers to as the 
“causal, or conditional” argument relating war to gender, described above, is rolled 
into a single concept, as an assumption. This empiricisation removes and obscures the 
argumentative and directional aspect of this relationship – that combat produces the 
heroic, hegemonically masculine, soldier. The critical literature thus correspondingly 
risks (re)producing the essentialised understanding of combat/gender of the 
conventional literature, wherein combat is inherently masculine, and hegemonic 
masculinity will, inevitably, refer to, or be positioned against, combat violence. Similar 
to men, as observed by Morgan, “seeking the best of reasons to distance themselves 
from dominant and harmful models of masculinity”, so too may critical scholars 
“unwittingly perpetuate a one-dimensional and quasi-naturalistic model of ‘man the 
warrior’” (1994: 179).  
 
Unlike the broader gender and war literature, which holds space for examining the 
ways in which “masculinity anchors war, in the sense that it provides a framework 
through which war may be recognised, understood, and judged” (Hutchings 2008: 
393), we currently lack a corresponding critical awareness of, and attention to, the 
role of gender in constituting ‘combat’. As a result, we are unable to interrogate 
combat as a gendered (and classed, racialized, sexualised) structural category, social 
P a g e  | 13 
 
identity, and process – as political. We have only a partial grasp of a complex process 
of mutual constitution.  
 
Implications of “Slippage”: Revisiting Key Texts with View to Co-Constitution 
 
By way of closing, we demonstrate in detail the process of conceptual slippage and its 
implications for critical analysis by revisiting two influential studies of combat, the 
military, and masculinity that we cite as both significant to the theorisation of military 
masculinities, including combat as a normative category, and illustrative of the 
broader problem of slippage we identify. In doing so, we re-read these texts’ empirics 
from the perspective of the co-constitution of gender and combat to provide an initial 
demonstration of the critical pay-off of our argument. We begin with Frank Barrett’s 
(1996) study of masculinities in the US Navy. We then discuss Cara Daggett’s (2015) 
discussion of US military masculinities, drones and the queering of killing in war. We 
have chosen these pieces because they represent, in Barrett’s case, an influential early 
theorisation of the topic that has been widely cited, and, in Daggett’s case, a strong 
piece of contemporary theorising on military masculinities. Both pieces successfully 
theorise military masculinities as a hierarchically organised plurality rather than 
monolith, and illuminate the inter-relation of combat, manliness and soldierliness. 
Whilst Daggett’s analysis undertakes this more explicitly than Barrett, both pieces can 
be read as concerning the maintenance of the heroic soldier myth and the production 
of martial violence as ‘combat’. Both pieces however illustrate the conceptual slippage 
that we described above which limits the extent these inter-relating dynamics can be 
critically unpacked. 
 
Frank Barrett’s article represents an approach to combat and masculinities that owes 
much to the more traditional, empirical usage we discussed above. However, the 
gender-normative character of the notion is more fully realised here than in those 
literatures. Within the broad canon of military masculinities research, the article was 
particularly valuable in how it deconstructed what had elsewhere been characterised 
as a more monolithic military masculinity, revealing varying “constructions of 
masculinity … across [Navy] job specialities” (Barrett, 1996: 129). Barrett set out to 
complicate “the link between masculinity, violence, and the military” captured in the 
common sense “image of ‘man the warrior’” (Barrett, 1996: 130).  
 
Throughout the analysis, combat appears as an anchor of military masculinity, and 
central to the pursuance of the heroic ideal. Gender is defined in relation to combat, 
which remains an empirical ‘thing’ around which gendered identities orientate. In 
Barrett’s analysis, the relational ranking of masculinities in the US Navy places the 
‘combat speciality’ of aviation at the top, the ‘combat speciality’ of surface warfare 
second, with ‘non-combat’ “support communities” (131) occupying “the lowest status 
in the Navy” (138). Those working in support communities “have [in contrast to their 
combat-specialist colleagues] fewer opportunities to demonstrate courage, 
autonomy, and perseverance, the hallmark of the hegemonic ideal” (138). Barrett 
therefore highlights how combat is an organising feature of the gender structure of 
the US Navy. In this analysis however, combat remains a common sense ‘thing’ that 
some encounter and some don’t, rather than a particular hegemonic imaginary of 
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martial violence. The piece reveals the ways in which the heroic soldier myth is 
maintained, by privileging those that have the most direct contact with violence and 
disparaging those who are further from it – a gendered proximity-distance 
configuration which Daggett (2015) develops upon in her work.    
 
Conceptualised as an empirical thing – albeit strongly normative – combat can define 
gender but does not seem to be in turn defined by it. This means the work that gender 
does to privilege and legitimise violence cannot be fully traced. Close reading of the 
piece hints, however, at the ways in which combat is, rather than a static and 
straightforward opportunity to demonstrate particular ideals, a normative 
imagination not only constituting but also constituted by gender. Barrett notes that 
Naval aviators, those with the highest status, are understood within the institution as 
“embodying the ideal” of masculinity (134). This is associated with involvement in 
‘combat’ but also “boldness, irreverence” and “aggressive heterosexual activity” (134). 
Barret records that “for those [pilots] who engaged in combat, the experiences were 
unforgettable”; “the most intense experiences of their lives” (134), expressed as 
“feelings of transcendence and vitality” that are “usually reserved for the sacred.” 
(135).  
 
These accounts can be re-read as examples of how very particular imaginaries of 
violence call moments of warfare into meaning in particular, valued and privileged 
ways. In the case of one of Barrett’s interviewees, a pilot, particular tropes of the 
combat imaginary (proximity, death, reciprocal danger) are mapped onto the account 
of flying “the entire length and breadth of Kuwait in one day” so that it can become 
intelligible as “flying combat in the Gulf”. There is death, for example, – “the burned 
out tanks, the bodies” – and there is some form of reciprocal peril: “if you hit a 
telephone wire you were dead”. Proximity is emphasised; the aviator describes flying 
“10 feet above the ground”. (Barrett, 1996: 135). The coding of flying as combat is a 
function of gender working at the broadest level of framing. The attachment of the 
figure of the masculinity-embodying aviator to flying enables flying to be understood 
as ‘combat’ and in order to be intelligible in these terms risk, reciprocity and proximity 
are emphasised. The construction of this warfare as combat within the terms of the 
heroic myth works, therefore, to simultaneously maintain the heroic myth and ‘code’ 
this particular violence as glorious, right and legitimate – or even bordering on sacred.  
 
In Frank Barrett’s study, combat is treated as an empirical given, albeit one with a 
strongly normative, gender-defining and gendered-power organising association. In 
Cara Daggett’s (2015) exploration of drone warfare, to which we next turn, we see 
combat appear as both normative and empirical category, with the distinction or 
relation between the two not always clearly apparent. Combat is here understood as 
a synonym for ‘killing in war’ and as a normative form of martial violence that must 
be (re)imagined, protected and sustained. 
 
Daggett unpacks how drones make the categories of martial violence ‘strange’, 
troubling the ‘common sense’ of its privileged and fetishized forms. The co-
constitution of combat and masculinity are submerged but present dynamics in the 
analysis. Daggett notes that martial violence is “located along the hierarchy of 
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militarized masculinities that helps to render killing in war morally intelligible” (2015: 
362) and at the same time the “orienting “straight” path of killing in war” constitutes 
“a compass for militarized masculinities” (363).  She describes how this ““straight” 
path of combat, [provides]…familiar landmarks (enemy, courage, combat, coward)” 
that offer “moral and practical bearings for killing in war” (362). In this way, combat is 
clearly at work as a normative imaginary, locating the soldier hero and the good wars 
‘he’ fights and co-constitutively locating violence as morally intelligible or not through 
a mapping of that violence onto the “hierarchy of militarized masculinities” (362). 
These ““lines” that orient state violence” and are “a compass for militarized 
masculinities” are “queered” by drones (363); drones pose a problem for the 
straightforward operation of the soldier myth. “The pinnacle of hegemonic warrior 
masculinity” is located “at the site of intimate killing in the midst of combat, with other 
experiences judged by their proximity to this point.” As with Barrett’s Gulf War pilot, 
emphasising reciprocity, danger and proximity, “hegemonic warrior masculinity is 
secured not just through the difficult act of killing up close, but in doing this while 
making one’s body vulnerable to being killed” (365) Yet, “because drone operators are 
protected from death, they are disqualified from performing as ‘real’ warriors because 
their bodies are not sited in combat.” (363).  
 
The normative work that the combat imaginary undertakes is therefore a key part of 
the analysis. A sense of gender and combat as mutually constituting comes through. 
Yet combat is at the same time regularly deployed as a synonym for ‘killing in war’. It 
is noted that an “increasing share of combat [is] performed by drone assemblages” 
(369) although “drones have not completely replaced more traditional combat” (375). 
“Drone warfare make[s] combat on homesites while at the same time these agents of 
violence avoid entering idealized sites of combat” (366). Empirical combat-as-killing is 
therefore subdivided into that which is ‘idealized’ (and therefore normative) and that 
which is not; it might have varying normative rank but in the final analysis it remains 
an empirical thing that just ‘is’. As with Barrett’s analysis, there remains something 
‘common sense’ about this conceptualisation of combat that shifts it out of the ambit 
of analysis and critique, as it appears given rather than constituted. It remains 
‘offstage’; a thing against which masculinities and other forms of martial violence can 
be measured. The constitution of the measure remains obscured.  
 
Because a common sense of combat-as-killing-in-war is retained, the politics of 
producing this martial violence as combat (or the failure to do so) cannot be fully 
brought into focus. Daggett notes that drone violence “cannot be located along 
traditional gendered maps that orient killing in war” (364), to which we think it is 
important to add as combat (or not). Drone operators make visible the instability of 
the heroic soldier myth, which must be preserved and protected. But they also make 
visible the instability of legitimate martial violence. There is little to qualitatively 
separate the violence of a missile fired from a drone from that fired from a Naval 
aviator’s F18. These acts of martial violence can be coded very differently however 
within imaginaries of gender and violence so that one is straightforwardly understood 
as combat (as in Barrett’s study) and one is not (as Daggett describes). As is apparent 
from Daggett’s empirical source material, the public discrediting, mocking and 
broader feminising of drone pilots who have claimed that they are engaged in combat, 
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(369) is achieved by highlighting how they might rupture of the myth of the heroic 
soldier. Doing so is at the ‘cost’ of placing drone killings in an ambiguous ethical space: 
they are not fully counted as valued and privileged, good and righteous ‘combat’. 
Drone operators are termed the “chair force” and they are commonly represented 
sitting in “ergonomic chairs, drinking coffee and eating junk food” (367), the only 
danger posed by an accidental burn from a Hot Pocket (368).  
 
If we understand masculinity as constituting ‘combat’,iv we should pay attention to 
the ways that imaginaries of violence, embedded in the heroic soldier myth, call 
moments of martial violence into value and legitimacy. If we do so, drone killings 
arguably pose more of a problem to the straight lines orienting gender and war than 
is accounted for in Daggett’s analysis because they pose a problem for the category of 
combat itself. To return to Barrett’s Gulf War pilots, the line between one-sided 
martial violence being ‘combat’ or not might come down to how easily the respective 
dangers of phone lines and hot pockets can be accommodated within a maintenance 
regime for the heroic soldier myth. In this way, the maintenance of the heroic soldier 
myth and the myth of legitimate martial violence are co-constitutive projects. Drones, 
at least for now, destabilise ‘combat’ itself, the common sense basic unit of warfare.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Scholarship does not exist externally to public narratives of soldiers, soldiering, 
violence and war. Deconstructing the figure of the soldier is key to the intervention 
that critical feminist and gender work undertakes in this context and the concept of 
military/ised masculinities has been a useful tool for achieving this. In this paper we 
have aimed to take seriously the point that there is nothing “obvious” (Enloe, 
2013:261) about ‘combat’. Writing within the critical feminist tradition we have felt 
uneasy, including with our own work, at the ways that a well-rehearsed link between 
masculinities and combat can slip into a tacit common sense that combat is a ‘thing’. 
Does this common sense hamper us in our efforts to deconstruct militarist myths such 
as that of the heroic soldier, and further, might it represent a continuing investment 
in that myth?  
 
A ‘common sense’ empirical conceptualisation of combat characterises the 
conventional literatures on war that feminist and gender approaches have written 
against. But we have argued that it survives in these critical literatures. We suggest 
that this tenacious common sense does two related things. Firstly, it obscures the co-
constitution of gender and combat as a privileged and war-legitimising imagination of 
martial violence. If combat is just a ‘thing’, then it is easy enough to see how martial 
manliness can be produced through association and exposure to it, but less easy to 
see the extent to which ideas of martial manliness (with its entailed legitimacy) in turn 
produce war violence as ‘combat’. Put another way, imaginations of combat are a way 
for soldiers to “prove their manhood” (Enloe 2013: 260). But how and in what ways is 
violence ‘proved’ against imaginations of manliness? How does violence become 
‘combat’ – and therefore a legitimate mode of martial violence – through association 
with particular imaginations of manhood? Gender is the engine of combat as a moving 
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target. A blurred definitional treatment of combat constrains our analytic ability to 
reveal the co-constitution of gendered power and privileged imaginations of violence.  
 
Secondly, the common sense of combat is a perpetuation of the investment in the 
idea of the heroic soldier and the legitimate wars he fights. Combat is not a 
straightforward synonym for violence. The word invites associations that cannot easily 
be dispelled; the word ‘combat’ is therefore never just a word, rather it is a key term 
in a lexicon that perpetuates the epistemic normalisation and – indeed – celebration 
of state violence. To use combat as an empirical descriptor is to invest in the legitimacy 
of the broad and imaginative array of violences meted out by the state. This does not, 
of course, mean we should avoid talking about combat. Quite the opposite: we should 
take claims to and about combat seriously and understand the gendered and 
gendering and more broadly political work that such claims undertake. We should also 
take seriously denials of combat; when soldiers who have been involved in martial 
violence deny that violence was ‘combat’ (see, for example, Strong 2015), it is 
important to understand why. Ultimately, what we must not do is allow combat to be 
a common sense, a thing that is beyond the reach of our feminist curiosity (Enloe, 
2004). 
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i When we refer to soldiers we mean here a martial figure encompassing the different branches of 
the modern western military (i.e. army, navy and air force).  
ii Indeed, this understanding of “war as fighting”, albeit in a more open and contingent sense than 
articulated by Clausewitz, has been proposed as a key aspect of the nascent field of “critical war 
studies”, which otherwise departs from the assumptions of classical theories of war. See Barkawi 
and Brighton 2011. 
iii As we will discuss later it should also be understood as operating in the other direction: the 
ideals of martial masculinity organise this imagination of violence in particular ways that 
undertake specific political tasks. 
iv And, indeed, femininity as well – though this conceptual assemblage will likely take substantial 
empirical work to unravel. 
                                                        
